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Abstract
Events are central elements of human experience. Formally, they can be individuated in terms of
the entities that compose them, the features of those entities, and the relations amongst entities.
Psychologically, representations of events capture their spatiotemporal location, the people and
objects involved, and the relations between these elements. Here, we present an account of the
nature of psychological representations of events and how they are constructed and updated.
Event representations are like images in that they are isomorphic to the situations they represent.
However, they are like models or language in that they are constructed of components rather
than being holistic. Also, they are partial representations that leave out some elements and
abstract others. Representations of individual events are informed by schematic knowledge about
general classes of events. Event representations are constructed in a process that segments
continuous activity into discrete events. The construction of a series of event representations
forms a basis for predicting the future, planning for that future, and imagining alternatives.

What are the basic units of human experience? Objects are clearly central, and much research
has been devoted to how they are represented by the mind and brain.1 Collections of objects
form scenes, and scenes as well have also figured prominently in theories of perception and
conception (see COGSCI-287). People are clearly important to human experience, but people
feel like a special case—one can easily imagine life on a desert island with no other people
around, but not life without objects or scenes. In addition to these fundamental aspects of
thought, we believe that events are fundamental to human experience. They seem to be the
elements that constitute the stream of experience, the things that are remembered or forgotten in
autobiographical memory, and the components of our plans for future action. In this article we
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develop a framework for describing and studying how the mind and brain represent events, and
explore accounts of how ongoing activity is segmented into events.
We start with a review of an event semantics framework for thinking about situations and
events. Then we introduce the concept of an event model as an actively-maintained
representation of a current event, and describe how it relates to similar concepts. We
characterize how such representations are structured and how, in their creation, continuous
activity is segmented into events. This includes such ideas as events taking place in a spatialtemporal framework, involving entities that have properties and various functional relations to one
another. Along with this exposition we illustrate points with recent developments in the field of
event cognition that support these ideas. Following this we provide some basic principles of event
models, including incompleteness, flexibility, and relation to more general semantic knowledge.
We then discuss how people update their event models to take in and handle new information.
Finally, we present a discussion of more recent work on embodied cognition and perceptual
symbol theories and the importance these hold for event cognition.

Semantics of Situation and Events
2

In their book Situations and Attitudes (1983), Barwise and Perry provided a formal
description of how events are structured as part of their theory of situation semantics. Here we
concentrate on what they had to say about event structure. Their ideas are grounded in the idea
that the world can be organized in a variety a ways, but only some of these are recognized by
people. As such, the important elements and structure of an event are often, in some way,
imposed by a person. There is presumably a reasonably high degree of uniformity across people
in the way that they conceive of events. Thus, the components and structure of an event are not
deterministically derived from the world itself.
In Barwise and Perry’s account, events have a number of important properties. The basic
components of an event are individuals, the relations among individuals, their properties, event
states, and spatiotemporal locations. These components are present in all events. Individuals can
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either be considered as whole entities (e.g., Joe), or they can be broken down into parts in which
each part is considered as an individual (e.g., Joe's arm).
There are three basic types of relational information in Barwise and Perry's theory. Binary
relations capture the inter-relations among individuals and can capture actions among people,
such as one person kicking another, or social and kinship relations, such as one person being
another person's mother. Properties are a special class of relations that apply only to a single
individual. Finally, situational states are relational information that captures general
characteristics of the event, such as the fact that it is raining or that it is noon.
In addition to the different types of relational information noted above, events also are
embedded in spatiotemporal locations. The time and place at which an event occurs serves as a
framework for the event itself, constraining the individuals and relations and their configuration.
Barwise and Perry distinguished between two types of events: states-of-affairs and
courses-of-events. A state-of-affairs is confined to a single spatiotemporal location, and thus is
not dynamic. A state-of-affairs could be captured by taking a photograph. In contrast, a course-ofevents is a collection of states-of-affairs, and thus is dynamic. A course-of-events unfolds over
time and space. For a course-of-events to occur, there needs to be some concept(s) in common
across the states-of-affairs that serve to unify them. Individuals can serve as such invariant
uniformities.
Finally, Barwise and Perry distinguish between real and abstract events. Real events are
parts of the world, whereas abstract events correspond to nonphysical domains, such as
mathematics. From our perspective, under some circumstances, a common location may be
generated not by an actual physical location, but by a virtual location. This virtual location is an
abstract region that, when the two entities enter into it, allows them to interact with one another
although there their physical locations would be recognized as being quite distinct. For example,
a virtual location may be created when two people are having a conversation over the telephone,
3

or when a protagonist thinks about another location. Thus, locations can be conceptual as well as
physical.

3

In sum, situation semantics proposes that events consist of entities that have features.
Some of these features relate entities to each other. A state-of-affairs is a static configuration of
entities and features that is localized in time and space. A course-of-events is a sequence of
states-of-affairs that that unfolds over time, and is held together by some common attribute.
Barwise and Perry refer to states-of-affairs and courses-of-events as two types of events.
However, it is the second that corresponds to the psychological notion of event that we wish to
characterize here. In the following sections we investigate how a sequence of states can be
bound together into a coherent event.

Modelpalooza
We are now ready to turn from events themselves to their mental representation. The
literature uses a variety of terms to describe the representations people construct of real or
imagined experiences. These can be summarized with the hierarchy illustrated in Fig. 1. At the
4

broadest level is the mental model—a term introduced by Johnson-Laird and widely adopted by
cognitive psychologists. For us, a mental model is a representation of a set of circumstances.
This set of circumstances may or may not be tied to a specific event. As such, the term mental
model is quite broad and general. Mental models can be divided into two classes: system models
and event models. System models are mental models representing a functional system, such as
how a mechanical device works, how a computer programmer processes information, or how a
theoretical construct operates. System models themselves can be divided into two general
4

classes These are physical system models, which capture our understanding of physical
devices, such as a thermostat, a car engine, or a drawbridge, and abstract system models, which
capture our understanding of systems that are either wholly abstract, such as theories of
mathematics, or cannot be directly perceived, such as theories of subatomic physics. Other than
noting their existence, we do not consider system models further.
Event models capture the entities and functional relations involved in understanding a
specific state of affairs. This is in comparison to system models, which hold true across a range of
circumstances. Event models can be derived from perceptual/motor experience, such as our own
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interaction with the world, television, film, and virtual reality technologies, or from linguistic
descriptions. Because event models derived from language have received extensive attention, we
think it is helpful to distinguish these two cases. The term situation model was introduced by van
5

Dijk and Kintsch to refer to event models derived from language. We use the term experience
model to refer to event models derived from live experience. Some researchers working with
narratives have taken as a working assumption that situation models derived from language
6

share most of their properties with experience models. Our focus here is on event models.

Event Models
Event models are multidimensional representations. Real world events are composed of
different types of information that are inter-related in complex ways. As such, the mental
representations of events should reflect this complexity. In this section we outline some of the
major types of information that are involved in events. We draw heavily from previous work on the
role of situation models in narrative comprehension and memory, in particular the event indexing
7,8

model.

Spatial-temporal frameworks
First, each event occurs in the context of a spatial-temporal framework that serves as the
basis of an event model when it is created. Spatiotemporal location is a major organizing factor in
memory for events. All animals that have been studied show generally poorer memory for events
9

that are more distant in time. Although one might intuitively think that the temporal distance
effects are due to the decay of memory traces, the evidence suggests that they are mostly due to
differences between the spatiotemporal frameworks at encoding and retrieval. When the
conditions of retrieval match those of encoding memory is good and when they mismatch
memory is bad.
We distinguish between three types of spatial information: labels, locations, and relations.
A spatial label is simply the name given to describe a location, such as "Wrigley Field," "The
White House," or "Slovakia". Spatial labels are property information.

5

The spatial location itself defines where the event unfolds. This could be a physical
location, such as a room, a park, a city, or an abstract location, such as a conference call, a web
site, or a virtual environment. The centrality of spatial location to events is clear. Many studies of
event cognition focus on either spatial knowledge itself, or the impact of spatial information on
other cognitive processes.
Spatial relations involve the spatial interrelations among objects in an event. To illustrate
this, consider the sentence “The boy was next to the tree in the park.” The term “park” is the label,
the park itself is the location, and the boy’s being next to the tree is a spatial relation. However, it
is possible for people to treat spatial relations as a means to define subregions within a larger
spatial context.

10

It is also important to note that it is possible for event models to be “viewpoint” dependent
to some degree. That is, the model may be experienced or “read” based on a particular
perspective from within the model. This viewpoint may be based on the perspective in which the
information was originally learned, such as whether a space was experienced from a survey
(birds-eye view) or route perspective.

11,12

. Recent work on embodied cognition has also

demonstrated an influence of such perspectives on an event. For example, in a study by Borghi,
Glenberg & Kaschak,

13

people were asked to verify attributes of an item. The speed with which

they verified those attributes varied as a function of whether the perspective. For example, if
asked to verify information about a car’s steering wheel, this was done faster if one had the event
perspective of being in the car as compared to being outside of it. Finally, the influence of event
perspective can be seen in the difference between field and observer autobiographical
memories.

14

Field memories are memories that convey the field of view a person had when the

event was actually experienced. In contrast, observer memories are those in which a person can
see one’s self in the event, which is, in some sense, inaccurate remember because one rarely
sees one’s self during an event unless it involves a mirror, television camera, or some such. The
fact that people can have both field and observer memories suggests that there is some flexibility
in the perspective that one takes on an event model.

6

For an event model to be constructed, a spatial location needs to be specified or inferred.
When explicit information about a location is given, such as its label, or can be easily inferred
from the context, then an event model will use that location for the framework. However, if little or
no information is given, then a person may establish a general “empty stage” which serves as the
0

location information for the event model framework. For several pieces of information to be
integrated into an event model a person must be either explicitly told or must infer that the same
location is involved.
The importance of spatial locations is reflected in the finding that certain brain regions
seemed to be specialized for processing location frameworks. As one example, the
parahippocampal place area (PPA) has been reported to be more active when people are looking
at pictures of locations as compared to pictures of faces or objects.

16,17

The temporal framework is the period of time in which an event is unfolding. Like space,
time is important for events. In many cases a time frame is defined by the activities carried out by
18

the agents involved in a spatial-temporal framework , as well as how a person is parsing up the
19

passage of time . Activities that occur at different times are unlikely to be considered to be part
of the same event, unless there is some unifying relationship, such as a causal one. For example,
if someone sets a trip wire at one time, and then a person walks across it at some later point in
time, this can be considered a larger, extended event with a larger temporal separation between
20

the two sub events . However, in general, a discrepancy in time is likely to cause the information
to be attributed to separate events. Two entities in a common location are less likely to be part of
the same event if they were in that location at different times. For example, if a tiger were in the
same room as a zookeeper, it would be inappropriate for us to draw the inference that the tiger is
going to tear the poor zookeeper to shreds if we also know that they were in the room at different
times. So, for an event model to be constructed, temporal location needs to be explicitly specified
or inferred.
The duration enclosed by a time frame can vary widely depending on the actions or
relations that are involved. For example, a telephone call from a telemarketer would comprise

7

somewhere from a few seconds to a few minutes, but a vacation could be anywhere from several
days to several months.

18

In many situations, one may not have detailed information about the

duration of an event, such as Japanese tea ceremonies and a train trip from Amsterdam to
Rotterdam

.21 22

Moreover, the exact boundaries of a temporal frame may be more or less fuzzy.

An inning in baseball or a courtroom trial session each has a precise beginning and ending, but
an afternoon of reading or a dorm party may not.
Although time and space are primitives in the sense that they are both necessary for the
creation of an event model framework, there are important differences. First, spatial location is
typically more restrictive in defining an event than is time frame. For example, knowing that a set
of events took place in the emergency room of a hospital provides more of a constraint than
knowing they took place on Thursday between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. As such, we expect
spatial framework information to be used more during comprehension and to serve as a better
retrieval cue during memory retrieval, and research on autobiographical memory suggests that it
23

does.

Second, spatial location is less likely to be redundant with other information. For example,
if you know a person is eating at a restaurant, you know general information about the location,
but you don't know the exact restaurant they are at; information that can have a profound impact
on understanding the event. There are no obligatory spatial markers that locate an event in space
relative to the place of utterance. In contrast, temporal framework information is more likely to be
redundant with knowledge of the activity, and is more likely to be linguistically marked, as with
verb tense. Furthermore, time frames can be localized within a larger time line using temporal
relational information. That is, an event can defined relative to others or the current time.
Third, space is symmetric whereas time is not. There is nothing special about Joe’s being
East of the tree rather than West, or right rather than left. However, for Joe to leave the bank
before the robber arrived is very different than for Joe to leave the bank after the robber arrived.

Entities and Properties

8

The entities in an event are often what are of most interest to people. A great deal of
event processing is oriented around them. For example, a person may want to know what the
moods of another person are, how do they relate to the other people in the situation, what their
goals and desires are, etc. This property information is bound in the event model to the token
standing for the entity.
Entity tokens are the points at which event models make contact with causal relations. To
understand an event it is important to know how the entities involved both are the sources of
causation and are affected by other sources of causation. As such, the degree to which an entity
requires or is involved in linking relations influences its importance in an event model. Entities that
are highly connected are more likely to be represented, whereas those that have little to no
24,25,26,27

bearing are unlikely to be well integrated into the model.

Associated with each entity is a collection of properties that identify it, such as its name,
physical characteristics, internal characteristics (e.g., emotions and goals), and so forth.
Information about properties can be directly associated with the entity. However, not all properties
are stored in the event model. Those properties that are causally relevant are more likely to be
stored. Property information that is important, but not directly relevant may be stored in the event
model, but may also be kept out and only be stored in a more generalized representation where it
can be called upon as needed.
A basic property of an entity is its name or identity. While this is a seemingly central
aspect of an entity, the name does not need to be specified in the model. For entities that recur
across many different events, this information may be stored in a referent-specific way and be
accessed as needed. For other entities, a specific name or identity is unnecessary. For those
entities, a token is present in the model and is not identified, but serves as a place-holder. For
example, if you know that Bill stood in line at the movie theatre, the model may contain tokens for
the people ahead and behind him in line. However, the identities of these people are left
unspecified. For those entities that are not identified, if the context is sufficiently constraining, and
the identity information is needed to understand a structural or linking relation, then identity can
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be inferred. For example, if a person is told that Bill is getting a root canal, one can infer with a
high probability that a dentist is the one giving it to him.
Another type of property associated with an entity is its physical characteristics. These
can include things such as size, color, texture, shape, and so forth. This is in line with perceptual
symbol theories of cognition (see below) that assume that people use mental representations that
incorporate and depend on perceptual qualities. Again, as with most other entity properties, these
characteristics are less likely to be incorporated into a model unless they are important to
understanding the functional structure of the event.
While some entity properties have a perceptual quality, others are internal to the entity,
and would not be perceptual per se. This can include things such as physiological state or health.
Probably one of the more interesting internal properties is a person’s emotions. Emotions are
important because they often provide a source of impetus for actions and provide a source of
causal explanation for why people act the way they do. It is clear that people use emotions to aid
comprehension.

28,29,30,31

Non-living things also have internal properties. For example, a car may

have a dead engine or a cabin may be warm or cold inside.
Goals are an important internal property of entities that serve as agents.

32,33

A goal is a

state of affairs that an entity acts to bring about. They are related to desires, needs, and
motivations. Goals may be caused by desires or needs. For example, a person who desires a
martini or needs water to prevent dehydration may adopt the goal of ingesting a beverage.
However, desires and needs can be distinguished from goals because it is possible to have the
former without the latter. A castaway on a desert island may desire a television but not adopt the
goal of obtaining one because it is futile. Because desires and needs cause goals and goals
cause behaviors, goals allow us to understand the actions of others.

Structural Relations and Linking Relations
Often what makes an event unique is not the space and time that it occurred, nor the
entities involved, but the relations of the entities to one another, the location they are in for that
event, or time at which that particular event is occurring relative to others. Relational information
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provides the unique structure for an event apart from the specific identity information assigned to
the other elements.
There are two types of relational information. One is structural relations that specify the
inter-relations among entities. These can be either within a given time frame, such as the spatial
arrangement of objects, or more stable characteristics, such as the layout of a building. Some
examples of structural relations are spatial relations, ownership relations, kinship relations, social
relations, etc.
Spatial relations are structural relations that convey the spatial configuration of entities
within an event. However, while a spatial framework is needed for event model creation, spatial
relation information is not. Instead, spatial relations are more likely to be ignored unless (a) the
person has a goal of learning this information, (b) there are enough processing resources to
devote to this information, or (c) the information is functionally or causally important to
understanding the situation.34
Another important point about spatial relations is that they help define a framework from
35

which other aspects of the event are interpreted. Franklin and Tversky describe a set of spatial
relations that locate objects relative to one’s body. One critical feature of their account is that
these reference directions are anisotropic. For example, whether something is up or down relative
to the body is more accessible than whether it is left or right.

35

Moreover, these spatial

frameworks can vary with respect to the perspective a person takes, such as whether a person
reading a narrative takes a first-person or third-person perspective on the events being
described.

36

The other type relation is linking relations that serve to link different events into a
sequence or collection. The most common types of linking relations are temporal and causal
relations. Temporal relations convey when a given event occurs relative to others, rather than
providing an absolute time period. Causal relations provide information about a causal chain of
events.

11

Causal relations are central for cognition. For example, when placed in classical
conditioning situations, people often try to make a causal attribution,

37

even if their behavior is

actually guided by mechanisms that do not take causality into account. That said, people do not
always draw causal connections between two pieces of information. For example, in a study by
Fenker, Waldmann, and Holyoak,

38

people judged the causal relationship between two words

(e.g., spark, fire). Responses were faster when the cause preceded the effect than the reverse.
However, when people judged whether two words were associated, and did not make a causal
judgment, this pattern was not observed. Still, overall causality is central to event model
construction.
Causal relations involve a temporally ordered dependency because causes precede their
effects. Further, causal relations require an event model with at least two spatial-temporal
frameworks. The first includes the cause and the second the effect. For example, consider “The
rocket launched the satellite into orbit.” An event model capturing this requires a spatial-temporal
framework whose spatial location is the launch pad and whose temporal frame is earlier, and
another whose spatial location is earth orbit and whose temporal frame is later. Thus, causal
relations are a part of extended, dynamic event models.
The degree to which information is part of a causal chain can influence whether it is
interpreted as being part of the same or a different event. Information that is causally unrelated is
more likely to be stored in separate models. In contrast, information that can be interpreted as
being part of the same causal chain is more likely to be interpreted as being part of the same
39

event.

Causal relations may also influence other aspects of a situation model. Information that is
relevant to the causal chain is more likely to be encoded than other information.

34,40

For example,

knowing that an open beach umbrella provides shade from the sun, or that a magnifying lens
dropped in dry grass can cause a fire, increases the probability that these spatial relations will be
encoded. Information that is relevant to the causal structure of an event model is said to be
functionally relevant.

12

Basic Principles
In this section we outline some basic principles of event models. The aim of these
principles is to provide a guide to how event models are constructed and operate in cognition.
What kind of information do they contain, and what kind of information are they unlikely to
contain? How do they relate to other types of knowledge?
The first of these principles is that event models capture important characteristics of
events in a ways that are functionally parallel to a real situation. “Functionally parallel” means
there is a second order isomorphism

41

between the representation and the thing represented. For

a second-order isomorphism there is a one-to-one mapping between modeled events and
possible events, and this mapping preserves similarity relations. For example, if one reads that
two poker players sat down at a table one might construct an event model with tokens for the
players. One might then read that either one more player or two more players joined the first two.
The number of players is represented in the event model in a functionally parallel fashion with the
resulting representation being more similar for the one-more-player case than the two-moreplayer case. The nature of the similarity is not determined: The number of players could be
represented (for example) by the firing rate of a population of neurons or by the particular
population of cells that are activated. Second-order isomorphism can be contrasted with a firstorder isomorphism in which a representation is a physical reproduction of the actual stimulus. In
that case, there would have to be a physical token for each poker player in the nervous system,
and adding a player would require adding a token. Second-order isomorphism also can be
contrasted with representations based on arbitrary relations. For example, if the number of poker
players were represented using English numerals, then the representation of two poker players
(“2”) would be no more similar to the representation of three players (“3”) than the representation
of poker players (“4”).
The second principle is that although event models are isomorphic to the events they
represent, they are not full-blown and complete replicas of them. Instead, a model contains
information relevant to understanding the basic structure of the event and little more. That is, they
may include components that are sketchy in a similar way that a drawing may be incomplete or
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have elements that are occluded. Because event models are partial representations this gives
them a degree of flexibility in terms of the number of possible event configurations that they could
conform to. For example, when reading a novel and then seeing a movie adaptation, the
incompleteness and flexibility of the event models created during reading allow one to map this
information into one’s experience of the movie and allow one to recognize it as the same basic
story. Perhaps one reason many of us find that movie adaptations do not live up to the books on
which they are is that the event models created while reading retain a greater element of
flexibility. (In addition, there are details that can be conveyed by text that are difficult, if not
impossible, to convey by film.) Note well that incompleteness is different from abstraction,
although it can facilitate abstraction. For example, if one has visited a certain bar on a number of
occasions, on returning one may be reminded of those previous occasions. Sketchier event
models may facilitate this reminding if they capture the features common to the repeated
instances, such as the location and the selection of beers on tap, while omitting the features that
vary from instance to instance such as one’s clothes and companions.
Event models are not holistic representations. Instead, they are componential. One can
see this by studying how event models are constructed. It appears they must be constructed
piece by piece, and this process can be time consuming and effortful. This was clearly shown in a
study by Zwaan.

42

In this study, people read narratives. Half of them were told that these were

newspaper articles (describing real events) and half were told that these were works of literature
(where the focus is on the language itself). Later testing measured memory for three levels of
representation: the surface form of the text (the exact wording), the specific facts or propositions
asserted by the text, and the situation described by the text, including implications and
assumptions not explicitly asserted. As can be seen in Table 1, people in the literary condition
remembered the surface form better than those in the newspaper condition, suggesting they
processed the details of the wording more thoroughly. People in the newspaper condition, on the
other hand, had stronger situation model memory, suggesting a more thorough encoding of the
events.As can be seen in Table 1, people in the newspaper condition had poorer memory for the

14

surface form, but better situation model memory. In comparison, people in the literary condition
had better memory for the surface form, but poorer situation model memory.

Table 1. d’ scores for the various levels of representation in the study by Zwaan 42 (standard deviations in parentheses).
Surface Form

Propositions

Situation
Model

Newspaper

-.05 (.54)

1.20 (.74)

.66 (.80)

Literary

.27 (.42)

1.46 (.90)

.14 (.71)

Different groups of comprehenders may have habitually different model construction
habits. For example, Stine-Morrow, Gagne, Morrow & DeWall

43

26

(see also Radvansky et al. )

found that on initially reading a story, older adults had relatively better memory for the situation
model compared to the surface structure of the text, whereas younger adults had relatively better
memory for the surface structure. On a second reading, older adults filled in more of the surface
structure whereas younger adults filled in more of the situation model. This show that the richness
and completeness of one’s event model may vary depending on one’s momentary
comprehension goals and based on one’s habits of understanding.

Referent specific knowledge
Events are unique. As such, each event model should, for the most part, stand for a
single event. However, despite the ultimate uniqueness of events, there are elements that
transcend a single event. Our knowledge about the commonalities across a set of events is a
form of semantic knowledge, and the knowledge structures that store it are referred to as event
schemas. Whereas event models represent particular events (instances), event schemas
represent classes of events (types). The concept of an event schema
specific notions of script

46

44, 45

is related to the more

47

and structured event complex. Unless we are referring to the

specifics of one of these constructs we use the more general term “event schema.”
Event schemas are helpful when a person needs knowledge to understand stereotypical
aspects of an event to either fill in unmentioned, but highly likely components for which a person

15

has a large knowledge base. Our view is similar to that of the schema-pointer-plus-tag model of
48, 49, 50, 51

schema processing.

In our view, pan-event information about specific referents is stored

in a referent specific memory apart from the event model. Moreover, non-relevant aspects of an
event are not directly represented in a model, but it may contain a pointer indicating that
information is stored elsewhere. This is especially true for minor and peripheral aspects of an
event. For example, for a model of the events in a house, rather than containing information
about all of details of each room, the model may contain pointers to such knowledge.

Segmentation
Suppose that you work in an office, and on arriving one morning you stop by the
mailroom where you have a conversation with a colleague, then walk down the hall to the lounge
and pour yourself a cup of coffee. Most theories would suppose that you formed two event
models, one for the mail-checking event and one for the coffee-serving event. People naturally
segment ongoing activity into events at such points, producing segmentations that are reliable
across observers and within observers over time.
events individuated? Gibson

54

Error! Reference source not found.47, 53

But how are these

held that events are individuated in virtue of invariant

spatiotemporal patterns that persist throughout the duration of an event. This works nicely for
simple physical events—for example, the event of a ball being dropped and bouncing is unified by
the dynamics of bouncing under gravity that persists throughout the bouncing.

55

However, to date

no one has offered an account of the individuation of everyday events—those involving people
and goal-directed actions—in these terms, and it is not clear that such an account is possible. For
events of this sort, Event Segmentation Theory (EST)

56

offers an account of how continuous

ongoing activity is segmented into events. Here, we give a brief summary of EST. Other
introductions are presented in Kurby & Zacks
account is given in Zacks et al.

57

and Zacks & Sargent,

58

and the full theoretical

56

EST begins with the presupposition that observers attempt to predict the near future as
an ongoing part of perception. Perceptual processing transforms sensory inputs to elaborated
representations that include predictions. This processing is influenced by event models. Event
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models bias the perceptual processing stream, allowing the comprehender to fill in missing
information and disambiguate ambiguous information. For event models to be effective, they must
for the most part be shielded from the vicissitudes of the sensory input, holding a stable state in
the face of missing, ambiguous, or partially conflicting information. Thus, while checking mail
one’s event model continues to represent the location of your mailbox, even if it is temporarily
occluded by a colleague leaning down to retrieve her or his own mail.
To be effective, event models also must be updated from time to time. If not, one will be
afflicted by perseveration—a mail-checking event model that held over to into a coffee-serving
event could lead one to misinterpret a drawer of silverware as a mail slot. But how to update
event models at just the right time, without an external signal cuing what the events are, or even
that a new event has begun? EST proposes that event models are updated in response to
transient increases in prediction error. At some point as you leave the mailroom and head toward
the lounge, things are likely to become less predictable. You walk through doors, encounter
different people and objects, see new causal sequences and goals in progress. EST claims that
when prediction error increases comprehenders update their event models based on the currently
available sensory and perceptual information. In most cases the new event model will be more
effective than the old one and prediction error will decrease as the system settles into a new
stable state. This process is illustrated in Fig. 2.
In the example of arriving at work, checking mail, and getting coffee, the comprehender
experiences the activity in the flesh and is also a participant. However, one may hypothesize that
the same mechanisms apply when the comprehender is a passive observer, and apply whether
the events are experienced through sight, sound and touch or through reading. EST further
proposes that people simultaneously maintain event models on multiple timescales. At a fine
temporal grain, prediction error is integrated over a relatively brief temporal window, and brief
increases in prediction error lead to updating. At coarser grains, prediction error is integrated over
longer windows and more sustained error spikes are needed to produce updating. Updating will
tend to be hierarchical, such that coarse-grained updating rarely occurs without simultaneous
fine-grained updating.
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What is the evidence for these proposed mechanisms? Behavioral and
neurophysiological data provide evidence that people construct a string of event models during
perception and reading. In perception, passive viewing of events produces transient increases in
brain activity at event boundaries.

59, 60

Similar results have been observed during reading.

61, 62

Converging results come from the finding that observers tend to slow down at event boundaries
and at those points at which changes that may produce event boundaries occur.
evidence that viewers

65

and readers

63, 66

64, 22

63

There is also

update memory representations at event boundaries.

For example, in one recent study Swallow and Zacks & Abrams

65

presented viewers with clips

from professional cinema that had been segmented by a previous group of viewers. From time to
time the clips were interrupted and the viewers’ memory for recently presented objects was
probed. In all cases the objects had last been seen exactly 5 s previously. However, when a new
event had begun during those intervening 5 s, information in working memory was rendered
much less available. (There was also evidence that information which had been encoded into
long term memory was slightly more available.)
These memory findings support the general proposal that event models are updated at
event boundaries. They also raise the more general question of how event models are updated,
to which we now turn.

Updating
There are four general ways the contents of an event model can be updated. The first is
that a new model is constructed (model creation). Second, information may be incorporated into
an existing event model (model elaboration). A third possibility is that an existing model is altered
to accommodate new information (model transformation). A fourth possibility is that information is
stored in two or more models, but then it becomes apparent that they refer to the same situation.
This information is combined into a single model (model blending).
Model creation is the simplest case. For example, in the structure building framework of
discourse comprehension,

67

model creation occurs because the reader detects that incoming

information in a text is relatively unrelated to the previous information. This could occur, for
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example, if the protagonist moves from one location to another or if a new character enters the
56

scene. In EST, model creation occurs as the result of a transient increase in prediction error.
Event model elaboration is also a relatively straightforward. There are two basic types of
model elaboration. The first is the addition of new information that was not included in a prior
version of the model, but that does not involve any change other than the addition of new
components. For example, suppose a person creates a model to represent the event “George
was sitting on a bench in the park." Later the person learns that “George was wearing green
overalls.” This information can be added to the model without changing any of the prior contents.
In this case, property information is added to the token for George to indicate that he is wearing
green overalls. Alternatively, elaboration may also occur when information is removed from a
model and this removal does not alter other contents of the model. This information would not be
involved in the functional, temporal, causal, or intentional relations among the entities in that
event.
Model transformation occurs when some aspect of a prior model needs to be altered
because of the new information. It is probably the most complex type of updating. The changes
involved are not minor in that there is likely to be some change in the functional, temporal, causal
or intentional relations among entities. These changes are not so drastic that a new model is
needed, but more processing is needed than with model elaboration because the structure of the
situation has undergone some meaningful change. Model transformation occurs when there has
been a major change in an event, but it is still interpreted as being part of the same course of
events. For example, a shift to a new spatial-temporal framework along a causal chain would
correspond to model transformation. Alternatively, the introduction of a new goal or subgoal for a
person would also correspond to model transformation.
The structure building framework

67

assigns a major role to model elaboration. As a reader

proceeds through a text, new information is continuously mapped into the current situation model.
Similarly, in Kintsch’s construction-integration theory,

68

new information is incorporated into a

model if it is associated to current information in the model. Importantly, associations allow
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information not explicitly mentioned to be incorporated. EST

50

departs significantly from these

accounts in assigning a smaller role to model elaboration. Specifically, EST proposes that model
elaboration occurs primarily immediately after model creation. Here is why: When a spike in
prediction error occurs, the input gates on an event model are opened briefly, and then close over
a brief window. As a result, elaboration ceases quickly the content of an event model is
dominated by information encountered at the beginning of an event. EST makes this proposal for
the sake of parsimony; whereas the structure building framework has two distinct mechanisms for
shifting and model elaboration, EST makes do with only shifting. At first glance, it may seem
counterintuitive that model elaboration should cease shortly after event model creation. However,
patterns that appear like continuous event model elaboration can be approximated if the
comprehender updates finer-grained event models while maintaining a coarse-grained event
model.
The final kind of updating process, blending, occurs when information has been stored
4

across two or more models, and the person realizes that it pertains to the same event. In this
case, these separate models are blended together to form a new, integrated model. This blending
occurs through an alignment of information along the relevant dimensions. For example, if a
reader reads that the protagonist of a story has crossed from one room to another, the reader
may form two separate models. If the reader then learns that the activities in the two rooms form
one unified causal sequence, the two models may be unified into a single model. This blending
process is critically important in theories of logical reasoning.

4

Model creation, model elaboration, model transformation and model blending all should
have unique behavioral signatures. Specifically, elaborating a model should lead to high
availability of the elements just added to the model, but should not lead to large increments in
processing time or decreases in the availability of prior information. Model transformation should
lead to major increases in processing time because more of the event model is being changed.
Furthermore, elements of the event model that were relevant prior to the updating may become
less available. Finally, model blending should reveal behavioral signatures of two events now
being treated as one. For example, this may result in a reduction in interference that was present
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before, with the person moving from having to coordinate two event models, to having the
information integrated in one. To date almost no research has been to assess whether and when
each of these forms of updating occurs.
In sum, there are a number of ways an event model may be updated. At one extreme,
event models may be formed from whole cloth and rebuilt each time an event boundary is
encountered. This is parsimonious but could be inefficient, insufficient, or both. At the other
extreme, event models may be incrementally updated, revised, and combined. This is flexible and
powerful—but perhaps too flexible and powerful, robbing event models of their explanatory force
in cognitive theories. An important challenge for future research is to pin down what sorts of
updating event models undergo.

Conclusion
In this article we have tried to describe the nature of event models, the sort of structure
they may have, and how they may be created and updated during online processing. The major
components of an event model include the spatial-temporal framework, the entities involved in the
event, as well as important or salient properties they may have, structural relations among entities
in an event, and linking relations among events. New event models are created when the
components of the current model no longer apply to the experienced situation. A possible
mechanism for identifying such points is the monitoring of prediction error. Event models may be
updated after they are created or simply replaced, and the relative role of each of these is
currently unclear.
Events are a fundamental aspect of cognition. They give our thoughts and action purpose
and are the basis of our intelligent understanding of the world. How we conceive of and represent
events allows us not only to predict the likely future, and plan effectively, but also to imagine new
possibilities. By better understanding how people conceive of and use their knowledge of events,
we can be better positioned to identify when prediction, planning, and imagination will be more
effective, and when they will have difficulty.
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